We characterize the class of (possibly incomplete) preference relations over lotteries that can be represented by a compact set of (continuous) expected utility functions which preserve both indifferences and strict preferences. This finding contrasts with the representation theorem of Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004) which either delivers a noncompact set of utility functions, or at least one function that does not respect strict preferences (unless the completeness axiom holds). For a preference relation of the sort we consider, our representation theorem reduces the problem of recovering the induced choice correspondence over convex sets of lotteries to a scalarvalued, parametric optimization exercise. Several applications of this observation are presented. Most notably, in an otherwise standard game with incomplete preferences, the collection of pure strategy equilibria that one can find using this scalarization method is found to correspond to a refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that requires the (deterministic) action of each player be undominated by any mixed strategy that she can follow, given others' actions. Along similar lines, we also obtain a refinement of Walrasian equilibrium and provide an equilibrium existence theorem assuming a continuum of traders.
Introduction
Starting with Aumann (1962) , early research on representation of incomplete preference relations under risk explored sufficient conditions that allow one to extend a preference relation by a single expected utility (EU) function. Put precisely, given a (possibly incomplete) preference relation , the purpose of a typical work in this early literature is to find an EU-function u that is -increasing (E p (u) > E q (u) whenever p q) and that is indifference preserving (E p (u) = E q (u) whenever p ∼ q). As noted by Aumann, the main merit of this representation notion is that maximization of an -increasing function over a choice set delivers a maximal lottery that can possibly be selected from that set by the decision maker defined by .
However, when studying economic phenomena related to indecisiveness, the researcher often needs to recover the choice correspondence induced by an incomplete preference relation in its entirety. Indeed, the best-known behavioral consequences of indecisiveness include (i) a certain degree of randomness in choices, which, as Mandler (2005) notes, may reflect itself with intransitivity of observed choice behavior; and (ii) the multiplicity of alternatives that might be chosen in a given situation, which is the focus of Rigotti and Shannon (2005) in their work on indeterminacy of equilibria in security markets. The study of how an agent might resolve her indecisiveness is a related area of research where the central goal is to determine a suitable procedure that describes the agent's behavior in choice problems which involve a multiplicity of maximal alternatives.
1 More generally, it has been recently observed that a variety of interesting behavioral phenomena can be explained by two-stage choice procedures where in the first stage the agent identifies a collection of maximal alternatives in a given choice set (with respect to an endogenously determined incomplete preference relation), and then makes her final choice among these maximal alternatives according to a secondary criterion.
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The problem of recovering the choice correspondence induced by an incomplete preference relation gave rise to the literature on multi-utility representations which provide a set of utility functions that fully characterize a given preference relation. In fact, it seems fair to argue that the virtue of such a representation theorem lies in its potential use as an analytical tool that can facilitate the exercise of identifying the choice correspondence associated with a preference relation which satisfies certain behavioral axioms. The performance of a representation theorem in this regard depends, in turn, on the properties of the set of utility functions that it delivers.
In this paper, assuming a compact prize space, we provide necessary-sufficient axioms on a preference relation over lotteries that allow one to represent by a compact set of -increasing and indifference preserving (continuous) EU-functions.
3 By a well-known "theorem of alternative," one can then show that, given such a preference relation and a representing set of utility indices U, an element of a convex set K of lotteries is maximal in K if and only if it maximizes over K the expectation of a weighted average of some utility indices in U. Thus, for a preference relation of the sort that we consider, our representation theorem reduces the problem of recovering the associated choice correspondence over convex sets of lotteries to a scalar-valued, parametric optimization exercise.
The axioms that we use in this representation theorem are surprisingly weak. Other than the independence axiom, all we require is the openness of (strict) upper and lower contour sets of the preference relation under consideration, and a further mild continuity axiom.
Though we focus on the same structural framework as Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004) (henceforth, DMO) , our representation theorem is logically distinct from theirs in that, under the axioms of DMO, a preorder cannot be characterized by a compact set of (strictly) increasing functions unless it is actually complete (or trivial).
4,5 Put differently, 3 A suitable normalization condition ensures the uniqueness of the representing set of utility functions up to closed convex hull. 4 The reason is that, as we just noted, this sort of a representation requires open contour sets while DMO focus on closed preorders. In turn, according to a fundamental result by Schmeidler (1971) , an incomplete and nontrivial preorder on a connected domain cannot satisfy both of these continuity conditions. We will elaborate on this matter in the next section. (A preorder is trivial if it declares maximal all alternatives.) 5 Bewley's (1986) seminal work in the Anscombe-Aumann framework also employs the open-continuity axiom and delivers increasing functions as the present paper. Though Bewley's original approach proved particularly useful in applications (see, e.g., Rigotti and Shannon, 2005) , in the subsequent theoretical work attention shifted to closed preorders. To our knowledge, the only exception is Manzini and Moriotti (2008) . Their representation is based on utility intervals (instead of a set of utility functions) and requires some independence assumptions which differ significantly from those used in the present paper and the rest of the multi-utility literature (see Footnote 23 below). The works in this literature that focus on closed preorders include Ghirardato et al. (2003) in a Savagean framework; Gilboa et al. (forthcoming) in the Anscombe-Aumann framework; Evren and Ok (2010) in the ordinal framework; Baucells and Shapley (2008) where a convex subset of a Euclidean space is chosen as the domain of preferences; and a paper of the present author which provides negative and positive results on DMO type representations over noncompact domains (see Evren, 2008) . It is also worth noting that in the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the focus of the literature has been "indecisiveness in beliefs," rather than "indecisiveness in tastes" which is the subject of DMO and the present paper. Ok et al. (2008) combine indecisiveness in tastes with indecisiveness in beliefs, albeit under the closedness assumption.
assuming away the case of a complete preference relation, a set of EU-functions that one can ever find using DMO theorem will either be noncompact or contain (at least) one function that yields the same expected utility for two lotteries one of which dominating the other. This, in turn, implies that under the axioms of DMO, the conclusion of the aforementioned scalarization result will typically fail. The trouble is that maximization of nonincreasing EU-functions over a choice set will deliver nonmaximal lotteries, and if one maximizes only the increasing EU-functions, typically it will not be possible to identify all maximal lotteries. In particular, we will present in this paper an example of a (nontrivial) preorder of the type considered by DMO that admits a plethora of lotteries which are not dominated by any other lottery and which do not maximize any nonconstant EU-function. In the same example, it is also true that the elements of a dense subset of maximal lotteries do not maximize any increasing EU-function.
In fact, given a preorder of the type considered by DMO, their representation theorem transforms the problem of identifying the induced choice correspondence to a vector-valued optimization exercise that is equivalent to the problem of finding the (strong) "Paretofrontier" of a utility possibility set. Moreover, this utility possibility set that one has to deal with typically consists of infinite dimensional utility vectors even when there are only finitely many riskless prizes.
6 It seems to us that the standard tools of economists are much more suitable for the class of aforementioned scalar optimization problems. While the present paper is mainly motivated by this tractability concern, it is also possible to draw a conceptual line between our representation theorem and that of DMO. More specifically, our theorem can be seen as a multi-self representation of a decision maker, for (at least on convex sets of lotteries) there is a one to one correspondence between the utility functions delivered by the theorem and different patterns of choice behavior that the decision maker might actually follow. By contrast, the behavior of an agent who can be describedà la DMO is analogous to that of a coalition of distinct individuals who respect the Pareto rule.
7
In this paper, we also discuss several applications of our representation theorem to individual choice theory, consumer theory, game theory and social choice theory. In some of these applications, we use the scalarization method to obtain characterizations of some (new or known) solution concepts. Most notably, in an otherwise standard game with incomplete preferences, the collection of pure strategy equilibria that one can find using the 6 Behavioral axioms that ensure representability of a preorder over lotteries by a finite set of EU-functions are unknown and likely to be rather restrictive. As a side payoff of our representation theorem, in Appendix B of this paper we will provide axiomatic foundations of preorders that can be representedà la DMO by a compact set of EU-functions (each increasing in at least one common direction).
7 Obviously, in both cases the corresponding multi-person interpretation refers to a set of agents who respect the completeness axiom.
scalarization method corresponds to a refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that requires the (deterministic) action of each player be undominated by any mixed strategy that she can follow, given others' actions.
8 Along similar lines, we propose and characterize a refinement of the notion of Walrasian equilibrium that requires the (deterministic) consumption choice of each agent be undominated by any random mixture of consumption bundles that she can afford. As a simple corollary, we will also establish the existence of such a refined equilibrium assuming a continuum of traders and incomplete preferences.
Notation and Terminology
Given a compact metric space Y , we denote by C(Y ) the Banach space of continuous, real functions on Y endowed with the sup-norm · ∞ . In turn, ∆(Y ) stands for the set of all (Borel) probability measures on Y , and ca(Y ) for the space of signed measures on Y . We equip ca(Y ) with the usual setwise algebraic operations and weak*-topology, which is the coarsest topology that makes continuous every functional of the form η → E η (u) := Y udη with u ∈ C(Y ). As is well-known, the induced topology on ∆(Y ), the so called "topology of weak-convergence," can be metrized by the Prokhorov metric. In what follows, topological concepts regarding subsets and elements of ∆(Y ) will refer to this relative topology. We will sometimes write E(η, u) instead of E η (u).
Following the standard conventions, by a binary relation R on a set A we mean a subset of A 2 , and often write aRb instead of (a, b) ∈ R. If A is a topological space, when we say that R is closed or open, we will be referring to the product topology. As usual, a preorder refers to a reflexive and transitive binary relation, which is said to be a partial order if it is also antisymmetric. If R is a preorder on A, given any K ⊆ A, we say that a point a ∈ K is R-maximal in K if there does not exist b ∈ K such that bRa and not aRb. Throughout the paper, X stands for a compact metric space of riskless prizes, and ∆(X) for the set of lotteries. In some part of our analysis, we take as the primitive a preorder on ∆(X), which is interpreted as the preference relation of a decision maker. When we follow this approach, we denote by and ∼ the asymmetric and symmetric parts of , respectively, which are defined as usual: p q iff p q and not q p; in turn, Nehring (1997) and Heller (2010) note, for the case of an incomplete preference relation, a lottery over two prizes x, y may dominate another prize z even if x, y and z are pairwise incomparable. More generally, given a (predetermined) nonconvex set K of feasible lotteries, the maximality of a lottery in K may not be sufficient to "justify" the choice of that lottery, for a random choice over the feasible lotteries may render better off the decision maker in question. In a recent application of the present paper, Heller (2010) provides choice-theoretic foundations of behavior that complies with this stronger notion of rationality, and derives a representation result by utilizing our main findings. A more detailed discussion of the choice-theoretic implications of our results can be found in Section 6.1 below.
p ∼ q iff p q and q p. The incomplete part of , denoted , is defined by p q iff neither p q nor q p. When p q, we say that p and q are -incomparable, meaning that the decision maker is indecisive between p and q. The preference relation is said to be complete if = ∅, and incomplete otherwise. In turn, we say that is nontrivial if p q for some p, q in ∆(X). As usual, the open-continuity property refers to the requirement that the sets {p ∈ ∆(X) : p q} and {p ∈ ∆(X) : q p} be open in ∆(X) for each q ∈ ∆(X).
It will often be convenient to focus on a transitive and irreflexive binary relation on ∆(X) which will be interpreted as a strict preference relation. When such a relation is taken as the primitive, incompleteness of the agent's (weak) preference relation can be deduced from the lack of negative-transitivity of .
Scalarization Method and Representations Notions
In his seminal work, Aumann (1962) proposed representing a preference relation on ∆(X) by an expected utility index u ∈ C(X) that is -increasing (E p (u) > E q (u) whenever p q) and that is indifference preserving (E p 
In what follows, we will refer to such a function u as an Aumann utility for . As we noted earlier, the appeal of this notion of representation mainly stems from the fact that a lottery which maximizes the expectation of an -increasing function over a set of lotteries is guaranteed to be a -maximal element of that set.
On the other hand, the exercise of finding a single Aumann utility for a preference relation is of limited use, for such a function simply extends the relation in question to a complete preorder, but does not characterize it. In particular, this approach ceases to be useful when one wishes to understand among which sorts of alternatives the decision maker in question is indecisive, or to determine the associated choice correspondence in its entirety.
To overcome this difficulty, DMO identified necessary-sufficient conditions which allow one to find a set of functions U ⊆ C(X) such that, for every p, q in ∆(X),
When viewed as an analytical tool, this representation transforms the problem of preference maximization to a vector-valued optimization exercise. Specifically, given and U as above, an element p of a set K ⊆ ∆(X) is -maximal in K if and only if the utility vector (E p (u)) u∈U is a ≥-maximal 9 element of the following set:
As the set U in (1) is typically infinite, it appears that this sort of a vector-valued optimization problem can be extremely tedious, even when the prize space X is finite. 10 To demonstrate how elusive such an exercise can be, it may suffice here to note that this sort of an optimization problem is equivalent to identifying the Pareto-frontier of the utility possibility set in an infinite society. Similar observations led optimization theorists to search for conditions that might allow one transform a given multi-objective optimization problem to a scalar-valued, parametric optimization exercise which produces, at least approximately, the same solutions as the original problem.
11 With regard to this scalarization issue, in the present framework the best-case scenario is a one-to-one correspondence between the -maximal elements and the maximizers of the representing set of utility functions:
where M ( , K) := {p ∈ K : there does not exist q ∈ K such that q p}.
The main finding of the present paper is an expected multi-utility representation theorem which ensures that the equality (2) holds whenever K is a convex subset of ∆(X) (Theorem 3 below). This result characterizes the class of preference relations that can be represented by a compact and convex set U of Aumann utilities as follows: For every p, q in ∆(X),
If one assumes that the set K consists of two lotteries p, q, or equals the closed line segment between these two lotteries, the right side of (2) would be contained in the left side only if p q implies E p (u) > E q (u). Put differently, a representation theorem can be compatible with the scalarization method that we shall utilize in the present paper, only if it delivers -increasing functions, as in our representation theorem. By contrast, the set 9 ≥ stands for the usual partial order on R U . 10 Let us note that when X is finite, (E q (u)) u∈U : q ∈ K is contained in a finite dimensional subspace of R U , but the order structure of this subspace (as determined by ≥) can be much more complicated than the usual order structure of a Euclidean space, unless one can choose the set U to be finite.
11 See, e.g., Ehrgott (2005) and references therein.
U in DMO representation (1) may contain functions that are not -increasing. In the Appendix, we will deduce Observation 1 from Schmeidler's (1971) theorem which shows that on a connected set a nontrivial preorder that satisfies the open-continuity property cannot be closed unless it is actually complete. To gain intuition, let us offer here an alternate proof for the case of a set of the form U = {u, v} ⊆ C(X). Suppose is nontrivial, and let r, w be two lotteries such that r w. Then, if both u and v are -increasing we must have E r (u) > E w (u) and E r (v) > E w (v) . Let p and q be arbitrary lotteries. If we can show that
we can deduce the desired conclusion from the uniqueness result of the classical expected utility theory. To this end, first suppose 
To complete the proof, suppose now E p (u) > E q (u). Then, clearly, there is a number
As we have just seen, this implies
Examples
For further motivation, we shall now present a few examples that demonstrate the difficulties of DMO approach with regard to the scalarization issue. First of all, as we already noted, if U represents in the sense of DMO, the equality (2) will typically fail. One may therefore think of utilizing some approximation methods.
12 However, any DMO type preorder admits an Aumann utility. In fact, as shown by DMO, given a countable dense subset U 0 of a set U as in (1), any continuous function on X which can be written as a positive-weighted sum of elements of U 0 is an Aumann utility for . It is also true that the set of all such functions would also represent in the sense of (1), but typically this set will not be closed.
Following earlier works on Pareto type, vector-valued optimization problems, one approach to this approximation issue is to seek for inequalities of the following form:
where U A stands for the set of -increasing functions in U. Of course, if one chooses the set U to be large enough to contain a constant function, the second inclusion in the above expression is not informative, for any lottery maximizes a constant function. This raises the following question: As we shall shortly see, the answer to this question is affirmative.
An alternate approach that one might follow is to maximize only -increasing functions and utilize a topological method to approximate the set of -maximal elements in a given choice set. Indeed, for a DMO type partial order on ∆(X) and a compact, convex
, where we denote by M A ( , K) the union of all sets of the form arg max q∈K E q (u) for some u in C(X) that is -increasing.
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However, in principle, the set M ( , K) \M A ( , K) may also be topologically large. Thus, in a given choice problem associated with a DMO type preorder, it may be impossible to recover a topologically large set of potential choices by simply maximizing Aumann utilities. In particular, M ( , K) \M A ( , K) may be a dense subset of K.
14 When this is the case, in order to recover the set M ( , K) \M A ( , K), if one applies the closure operator to M A ( , K), one would also end up with every lottery in K\M ( , K), which are not likely to be selected from K by the decision maker in question. In summary, the following question also seems to be of interest:
Q2. Does there exist a nontrivial partial order of the type considered by DMO such that
Let us now construct a nontrivial, DMO type partial order which provides positive 13 Makarov and Rachovski (1996) investigate this approximation problem for the case of an affine partial order on a topological vector space. The said observation on DMO type partial orders is an immediate consequence of their Corollary 4.4. To the best of our knowledge, it is an open question if the antisymmetry requirement is dispensable.
14 Here, an implicit difficulty is the fact that M ( , K) need not be a (relatively) closed subset of K. As we will see in Section 5.1, such anomalies do not occur for preference relations that we will characterize in our main representation theorems. 
. But whenever such an r belongs to arg max q∈∆(X) E q (u) for some
Part (i) of this observation shows that ∆(X)\M ( ∧ , ∆(X)) is a substantially large set. 16 However, it follows from part (iv) that the set M (
topologically so large that if one wishes to recover this set by applying the closure operator to M A ( ∧ , ∆(X)), it is inevitable to cover every "bad" lottery in ∆(X)\M ( Part (iii) of Observation 2 is a straightforward consequence of (ii), which we prove in the Appendix. For the present, it should be noted that the setÛ is closed, convex and bounded, but it does not contain a constant function. Hence, it follows from part (iii) that the maximization of a set U of utility functions delivered by DMO representation may not allow us to recover M ( , K), not even up to the inclusion relation given by (3) provided that one focuses on nonconstant utility functions.
In this example, part of the trouble is caused by the lack of compactness of the setÛ . Indeed, it is not difficult to verify the following claim:
15 Throughout the paper, δ x stands for the degenerate lottery supported at x ∈ X. 16 In fact, for any finite dimensional, convex subset ∆ 0 of ∆(X) which contains δ 0 , the set ∆ 0 \M ( ∧ , ∆(X)) has interior points relative to the affine hull of ∆ 0 . (But as X is infinite in this example, the relative interior of ∆(X) (with respect to its affine hull) is empty.)
17 To construct such an r that approximates a given lottery p on [0, 1], if p({0}) > 0 we can transfer this mass to a sequence (x k ) that converges to 0 and that is contained in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of 0. Similarly, an arbitrarily small mass from the support of p can be transferred to points that are arbitrarily close to 1 (and to 0 if we already have p({0}) = 0). Observation 3. If U and satisfy (1) for every p, q in ∆(X), and if U is a compact and convex subset of C(X), then (3) holds.
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As a side payoff of our main representation theorems, in Appendix B of this paper we will provide axiomatic foundations of preorders that can be representedà la DMO by a compact (and convex) set of utility functions (each increasing in a common direction). In light of Observation 3, this subclass of DMO type preorders seem to be better-behaved. However, still, maximization of a set of functions U as in Observation 3 may not allow us to recover the set M ( , K) precisely, for both of the inclusions in (3) may indeed be proper inclusions. Let us now demonstrate this point within the context of the classical consumer theory.
Example 1. Put
and
where, for every x ∈ X,
It is clear that arg max x∈X u(x) = {x ∈ X : x 1 + x 2 = 2, x 3 = 2} , and arg max
However, x * := (1, 1, 2) is the unique maximizer of v on arg max x∈X u(x), implying that the lottery δ x * is the only element of arg max q∈∆(X) E q (u) that is -maximal on ∆(X), where is the preorder on ∆(X) induced by U via the rule (1). Hence, arg max
Moreover, δ x * does not maximize the expectation of any -increasing function f ∈ C(X) on ∆(X). To see this, take any such f . Since U is normalized in the sense that u(x * ) = v(x * ) = 2 and u(0) = v(0) = 0, where 0 := (0, 0, 0), by normalizing f accordingly we can assume that f ∈ co (U) (for more on this argument, see the proof of Theorem 2 below). 20 In fact, since neither u nor v are -increasing, we can write f = αu + (1 − α)v for some α ∈ (0, 1). It easily follows that
, and hence, x * / ∈ arg max x∈X f (x).
18 Bade (2005) proves similar results for the case of a polyhedral set U. 19 When X is a subset of a Euclidean space, we denote by x i the ith coordinate of a vector x ∈ X. 20 By co we mean the convex hull operator, and co stands for the closed-convex hull operator.
Finally, we remark that when the set X is finite we can precisely recover M ( , ∆(X)) by maximizing all Aumann utilities for a DMO type preorder , but this observation (which is due to Aumann (1962 Aumann ( , 1964 ) cannot be generalized to the case of an arbitrary compact convex set K ⊆ ∆(X). Suppose, for instance, that X consists of three alternatives, and consider a closed ball B in the interior of ∆(X). Let u ∈ R 3 be a nonconstant utility vector, and denote by p the (unique) maximizer of E(·, u) on B. Now, we can pick a q ∈ ∆(X) such that E(q, u) = E(p, u) and q = p. Put v := p − q, 21 U := {u, v} and (p, v) ). Then, both p and q maximize E(·, u) on K, but only p is a maximal element of K with respect to the DMO type preorder induced by U (since p q). Moreover, there does not exist an -increasing f ∈ R 3 such that p ∈ arg max r∈K E(r, f ). (Hence, the conclusion of Example 1 applies to the set K as it is.) As Figure 1 illustrates, this scenario simply replicates a well-known problem related to the identification of the Pareto frontier of a utility possibility set contained in a Euclidean space. 
Representation Theorems
As before, X stands for a compact metric space of riskless prizes. We first focus on a binary relation on ∆(X) that is understood as a strict preference relation. We will later extend our model to distinguish between the notions of indifference and indecisiveness.
We say that is an open-continuous strict preference relation if it satisfies the following axioms.
Open-Continuity. For every p, q in ∆(X), whenever p q there exist a neighborhood N p of p and a neighborhood N q of q such that N p q and p N q .
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Independence. For every p, q, r in ∆(X) and α ∈ (0, 1),
Strict Preorder.
is irreflexive and transitive. q, q yields, by transitivity of , a neighborhood N p of p and a neighborhood N q of q such that r w for every (r, w) ∈ N p × N q . Moreover, is also asymmetric, for p q and q p would imply p p by transitivity, which contradicts irreflexivity of .
The next theorem shows that an open-continuous strict preference relation
can be characterized by a compact set of -increasing functions.
Theorem 1. Let X be a compact metric space. A binary relation on ∆(X) is an open-continuous strict preference relation if and only if there exists a nonempty compact set U ⊆ C(X) such that:
If admits a set U ⊆ C(X) as in Theorem 1, we will say that U is a utility set for . When proving this theorem, we will see that, in fact, given any pair of lotteries p
• , q
We will refer to such a set U as a (p • , q • )-normalized utility set for , or simply as a normalized utility set if the choice of a particular pair (p
turn, given any nonempty, compact U ⊆ C(X), by U we will denote the binary relation on ∆(X) defined by U as in part (i) of Theorem 1.
It is important to note that if U is a utility set for , so is any closed subset V of C(X) such that co (V ) = co (U). By the uniqueness result of DMO, it can be shown that the converse is also true if one focuses on normalized utility sets: In passing, a few remarks on the proof of the "only if" part of Theorem 1 are in order. First of all, it should be noted that when the prize space X is finite, the proof is relatively simpler, for then the preference cone C := {γ(p−q) : p q and γ > 0} turns out to be open (in its span), and standard duality arguments suffice to obtain a closed and bounded utility set, which will also be compact. In general, however, the set C is only boundedly open, i.e., for any (total variation) norm-bounded subset B of the span of C, the set B∩C is relatively weak*-open in B. We provide two different methods that overcome this difficulty. The initial step in the first method is to show that the closure
* of an open-continuous strict preference relation is a DMO type preorder. (The main challenge in this direction is to verify transitivity of * .) After completing this task, using the open-continuity axiom and the findings of DMO, we show that, in fact, * admits a nonempty compact set U ⊆ C(X) that represents * in the sense of DMO and that satisfies condition (ii) of Theorem 1 for some predetermined lotteries p
Finally, by using the fact that C is boundedly open, we show that such a set U must also satisfy condition (i) of Theorem 1. Alternatively, one can focus on a finer topology which declares C open and which produces the same set of continuous linear functionals as the weak*-topology. This allows one to proceed, roughly speaking, as one would do in the case of a finite prize space.
Extension to Preorders
We now consider a binary relation on ∆(X) that is interpreted as a (weak) preference relation. (As usual, we will denote by ∼ and the symmetric and asymmetric parts of , respectively.) Here, our purpose is to give a suitable extension of Theorem 1 that allows one to distinguish between the notions of indifference and indecisiveness embodied in . To this end, we will employ the following axioms.
Indifference Independence (II). For every p, q, r in ∆(X) and α ∈ (0, 1),
Symmetric Algebraic-Closedness (SAC). For every p, q, r, w in ∆(X) with r w,
II is motivated exactly as in the standard independence axiom. SAC, on the other hand, amounts to saying that, given any The following theorem is our main result, which completes the task of characterizing the class of preorders that can fully be described by a compact set of Aumann utilities. (ii) There exists a utility set U ⊆ C(X) for such that, for every p, q in ∆(X),
Moreover, upon normalization, the set U is unique up to closed convex hull.
23 By contrast to the interval representation of Manzini and Mariotti (2008) , our multi-utility approach does not require independence axioms on -incomparable lotteries. More specifically, an important difference between the two models is that in the present approach we allow for the existence of pairwise -incomparable lotteries p, q, r such that 1 2 p + 1 2 q r. Such situations may give rise to nonbinariness of choice behavior induced by an incomplete preference relation, which has attracted considerable attention in the literature. (For more on this, see Section 6.1 below.) Furthermore, the representation of Manzini and Mariotti implies that for any p, q, r with p q, the independence property αr +(1−α)p αr +(1−α)q will typically fail for large α ∈ (0, 1).
24 The said closedness property, however, is too strong for our purposes by Schmeidler's (1971) theorem.
Remark 2. As we have seen in Observation 1, the representation theorem of DMO is logically distinct from Theorem 3.
While we are interested in Theorem 3 mainly for tractability concerns, the conceptual content of this result, as a multi-self representation, is also remarkable. Though the term "multi-self representation" is used in the literature in several different meanings, in the present context it seems reasonable to view a function u ∈ C(X) as a description of a possible self of the agent defined by if, in principle, the agent defined by might behave as if her choices are guided by maximization of E (·, u) . 25 In formal terms, this amounts to requiring that maximization of E(·, u) over any set K ⊆ ∆(X) should return -maximal elements of K. In this precise sense, Theorem 3 is a multi-self representation result thanks to the fact that it delivers -increasing functions. It is also worth noting that, given a set U as in Theorem 3, whenever E p (u) = E q (u) for some u ∈ U we cannot have p q (as each function in U is -increasing). This is a logical requirement for the validity of the above interpretation. Indeed, whenever E p (u) = E q (u) for some u ∈ U, it would follow that a "self" of the agent may choose q when p is available, while p q would imply that the agent "herself" would never behave in the same way. Put differently, in the present model, whenever E p (u) = E q (u) for some u ∈ U, the agent defined by may choose either alternative from the set {p, q}.
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By contrast, given a nonempty set U ⊆ C(X) that represents a preorder * in the sense of DMO, the choice behavior induced by * is analogous to that of a coalition of distinct individuals, as defined by U, who respect the Pareto rule:
Hence, a typical function u ∈ U may not bear sufficient information to determine a * -consistent choice among two lotteries p and q, as we may have
More on Scalarization and Maximal Elements
In this section, we will show that recovering the choice correspondence associated with a preference relation can be reduced to a scalar-valued, parametric optimization exercise provided that the strict part of the preference relation satisfies hypotheses of Theorem 1.
We will then investigate some further desirable properties that are peculiar to choice correspondences associated with such preference relations.
In the remainder of the paper, the symmetric part of the preferences of the decision maker in question will be irrelevant for our purposes. Hence, we simply focus on a strict preference relation on ∆(X), and modify our notation and terminology in an obvious way. For example, M ( , K) denotes the set of -maximal elements of a set K ⊆ ∆(X); that is M ( , K) := {p ∈ K : there does not exist q ∈ K such that q p}, which is interpreted as the set of lotteries that can possibly be chosen from K by the decision maker. Moreover, throughout this section, without further mention we assume that X is a compact metric space.
As we noted several times, it is plain that maximization of the expectation of anincreasing function on a set K ⊆ ∆(X) would deliver a -maximal element of K. A more interesting question is the converse: Given a utility set U for , is it true that each element
The next proposition shows that the answer is affirmative if K is convex and if one focuses on a convex utility set.
Proposition 1. Suppose that is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X), and let U ⊆ C(X) be a utility set for . Then, for any convex subset
Remark 3. Using the terminology of the previous section, Proposition 1 simply says that the agent defined by may choose a lottery from a convex subset of ∆(X) if and only if this is consistent with the behavior of a self of the agent as defined by a function in a convex utility set.
On occasion, it may be of interest to focus on a smaller utility set U, and express every function in co (U) as a weighted average of functions in U. This can easily be done thanks to compactness of U and a (primitive) version of Choquet's theorem which guarantees that a point l of a locally convex topological vector space L belongs to the closed-convex hull of a compact subset H of L if and only if there is a (countably additive, Borel) probability ϕ on the set H such that T(l) = H T(h)dϕ(h) for every continuous, linear functional T on L.
27 Since (by the Riesz representation theorem) a continuous linear functional on C(X)
is none but a function of the form v → E η (v) for some η ∈ ca(X), it readily follows that a 27 See Phelps (2001, Proposition 1.2, p. 4).
continuous, real function v on X belongs to co (U) if and only if there exists a ϕ ∈ ∆(U) such that E q (v) = U E q (u)dϕ(u) for every q ∈ ∆(X). 
Given the definition of a utility set, Proposition 1' is simply a version of a theorem of alternative due to Fan et al. (1957) . In passing, we sketch the argument for the sake of completeness.
Proof of Proposition 1'.
Since the other inclusion is trivial, suffices to show that
, and note that for
is an affine operator, convexity of the set K implies that K :
++ is an open convex cone, 29 by standard separation and duality arguments we conclude that there exists a
Continuity Properties and Connectedness of M ( , K)
Our next task will be to establish upper hemicontinuity of the choice correspondence induced by an open-continuous strict preference relation. Given a sequence (K n ) of subsets of ∆(X), we define lim inf K n := {lim p n : (p n ) converges and p n ∈ K n for every n} , and lim sup K n := lim inf K n where the union is taken over the collection of all subsequences of (K n ) with a generic member (K n ). When lim inf K n = K = lim sup K n , the set K is said to be Kuratowski limit of (K n ). Since ∆(X) is compact, on the collection of nonempty closed subsets of ∆(X) (denoted as K), the notion of Kuratowski convergence coincides with convergence in the Hausdorff metric, d H .
Upper hemicontinuity of a choice correspondence induced by a strict preference relation demands, in fact, nothing more than openness of that relation:
28 It can be shown that, given a compact set U ⊆ C(X) and any ϕ ∈ ∆(U ), the system of equalities E q (v) = U E q (u)dϕ(u) (q ∈ ∆(X)) has a unique solution v * ∈ C(X) which is defined by v
29 Throughout the paper, by a convex cone we mean a convex subset of a vector space that is closed under positive scalar multiplication.
Observation 5. Let ⊆ ∆(X)
2 be relatively open. Then:
In particular, for any K ⊆ lim sup K n ,
That is, for any convergent sequence (p n ) with p n ∈ M ( , K n ) for every n, whenever lim p n belongs to K it also belongs to M ( , K).
Here, the critical observation is (ii). Indeed, (i) is a trivial consequence of (ii), and (iii) also follows immediately because K ⇒ M ( , K) , when considered as a correspondence from (K, d H ) into ∆(X), has a closed graph by (ii), and its range is compact. On the other hand, (ii) readily follows from definitions: If q lim p n for a lottery q and a convergent
otherwise openness of would imply that q n p n for some large n and q n ∈ K n .
In contrast to the conclusions of Observation 5, for a DMO type preorder * , the set M ( * , K) need not be closed, even if K ⊆ ∆(X) is compact and convex. While
Observation 2 already demonstrates this point, since the Pareto frontier of a compact convex set in a Euclidean space may not be closed, 30 using the aforementioned analogy one can also provide finite dimensional examples in the same direction. Moreover, typically, the correspondence M ( * , ·) is not upper hemicontinuous. In Figure 2 , for example, the increasing sequence of closed convex sets (K n ) converges to K ∞ . But with U := {u, v}, the lottery p is the unique maximal element of K ∞ with respect to the DMO type preorder * induced by U, while the lottery q belongs to M ( * , K n ) for all n.
We will close this section with the proof of the following result.
Observation 6. If is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X), and if K is a closed and convex subset of ∆(X), then M ( , K) is a connected set.
Thanks to Proposition 1, this observation is easily proved by adapting to the present setting an argument that is well-known in the literature on multi-criteria optimization.
30 See, e.g., Arrow et al. (1953, Section 3) . Figure 2 Proof of Observation 6. Let U be a convex utility set for , and assume by contradiction that there are two disjoint, nonempty, closed sets
The sets U 1 and U 2 are disjoint since arg max q∈K E q (u) is nonempty for each u ∈ U by compactness of K. Moreover, by Proposition 1, for any p ∈ M i we have p ∈ arg max q∈K E q (u) for some u ∈ U which implies in fact that arg max q∈K E q (u) ⊆ M i . Thus, U 1 and U 2 are nonempty, and as can easily be seen they are also closed. These conclusions contradict convexity of U.
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Applications
Incomplete Preferences and Nonbinary Choice Behavior
Let represent the strict preference relation of an agent who has to choose a lottery from a set K ⊆ ∆(X). Following the traditional practice, so far we have assumed that such an agent might choose any element of M ( , K). However, analogously to the use of a mixed strategy in a game-theoretic framework, in principle, our agent can condition her choice from the set K to the outcome of a random experiment such as flipping a coin or rolling a die. Considering any such randomization device that she could possibly use, we can thus say that, effectively, the choice set available to our agent is equal to co (K), or even more generally, to co (K) (provided that one also allows for the use of randomization 31 It seems to be a nontrivial problem to determine whether the analogue of Observation 6 holds for an arbitrary DMO type preorder. However, one can prove a positive result for the case of an antisymmetric DMO type preorder using the aforementioned finding of Makarov and Rachovski (1996) (see Footnote 13).
devices that can return infinitely many outcomes).
32 Upon relaxation of the completeness axiom, this observation becomes material, for -maximality of a lottery in K does not guarantee its -maximality in co (K), implying that the agent may have a reason to avoid choosing some elements of M ( , K). That indecisiveness may give rise to such nonbinary choice behavior has been widely recognized following the seminal work of Nehring (1997) .
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For instance, let us consider the following adaptation of Nehring's Example 1.
Example 2. Let X := {x, y, z} and pick any number ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Consider the opencontinuous strict preference relation U on ∆(X) induced by the set U := {u, v} where u and v are the real functions on X defined as in the following table:
Then, obviously, δ y is U -maximal in {δ x , δ y , δ z }, but we have
One can think of various real-life choice situations in concert with this example. Suppose, for example, that x, y and z are three different restaurants. While x and z are specialized in vegetarian and meat dishes, respectively, y offers both types of dishes, but at a lower quality. Our decision maker is supposed to make a reservation for two in one of these restaurants, but she does not know the preferences of her guest, who may or may not like meat. Then, in the former case, our decision maker may rank the restaurants according to v, while the relevant ranking may be as in u in the latter case.
More generally, Example 2 is intimately linked with extremeness seeking which refers to a tendency to opt for extreme alternatives in choice problems where feasible alternatives vary in multiple dimensions. Gourville and Soman (2007) provide empirical evidence which shows that extremeness seeking is rather common when alternatives differ in noncompensatory, not so easily comparable attributes, such as the features of a high-priced, fully-loaded model of a car versus those of a mid-priced, average model or a low-priced, basic model. Example 2 is in concert with this phenomenon. Indeed, x and z in this example can be considered as extreme alternatives that perform very well with respect to one of u or v, and very poorly with respect to the other function. Moreover, the observation 32 Of course, we view the convex combination α 1 p 1 + · · · + α n p n as a compound lottery that yields the lottery p i with probability α i . After all, the usual justification of the independence axiom relies on this interpretation. (By Choquet's theorem, one can similarly interpret the elements of co (K) provided that K ⊆ ∆(X) is compact.)
33 A recent discussion of the literature on nonbinary choice behavior can be found in Alcantud (2006) .
δ z U δ y suggests that, when faced with the choice set {x, y, z}, the decision maker in question would be better off if she randomly selects x or z with equal probabilities, instead of opting for the mild alternative y (despite the fact that neither x nor z is better than y).
34
In light of these observations, it seems to be in order to replace the traditional binary approach with the alternate model that declares rational to select a lottery p from the choice set K if and only if p ∈ K ∩ M ( , co (K)). Recently, Heller (2010) provided necessary-sufficient conditions that allow one to rationalize a choice correspondence C in this stronger sense. In fact, Heller studies the class of choice correspondences C that admit an open-continuous strict preference relation such that C(K) = K ∩ M ( , co (K)) for every K ∈ K. By combining Theorem 1 with the following observation, one obtains Heller's representation for such choice correspondences:
Corollary 1. Suppose that is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X) for a compact metric space X, and let U ⊆ C(X) be a convex utility set for . Then, for every nonempty
This corollary is an obvious consequence of Proposition 1, and hence, we omit its proof.
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Remark 4. As we have seen in Section 3, excluding some special situations, for the case of a DMO type preorder, one cannot obtain an analogue of the first equality in (5) (even if one focuses on a compact and convex set K). The second equality in (5) may also fail. For instance, if we let K 0 be the convex set obtained by removing the half-open line segment (q, p] from the set K in Figure 1 , then q is a -maximal element of K 0 , but we have p q and p ∈ cl (K 0 ) = K. (When the set X is infinite, one can find more interesting examples in the same direction. For example, in this case, the set of all lotteries with finite support is not closed, and hence, a lottery p which is maximal on this set with respect to a DMO type preorder may not be maximal on ∆(X).) 34 As Gourville and Soman (2007) discuss in detail, the opposite (i.e., extremeness averse) behavior is predominant in choice problems where feasible alternatives vary in easily measurable and comparable attributes, such as size/quantity and price. Thus, in a broader sense, extremeness seeking seems to be a consequence of incomparability of alternatives.
35 It follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 that given a choice correspondence C that satisfies Heller's (2010) axioms, one can find a compact, convex set U ⊆ C(X) such that C(K) = u∈U arg max q∈K E q (u) for every K ∈ K; which is the content of Heller's representation result. In an ordinal framework with finitely many alternatives, Eliaz, Richter and Rubinstein (forthcoming) prove an analogous representation which characterizes a decision maker who selects the feasible alternatives that are deemed best by (at least) one of two utility functions.
In the remainder of this subsection, we assume that X is a convex subset of a vector space. The next observation shows that if admits a utility set that consists of concave functions, then the traditional, binary approach coincides with the present approach in every choice problem where the set of feasible alternatives is a convex set of riskless prizes.
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Put differently, under the said conditions, the scalarization method can also be used to identify the maximal elements of a convex set of riskless prizes. (For a set D ⊆ X, we define K D := {δ x : x ∈ D}.)
Corollary 2. Let X be a compact metric space which is also a convex subset of a vector space. Consider an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X) which admits a convex utility set U ⊆ C(X) that consists of concave functions. Then, for every convex D ⊆
X and x ∈ D, the following four conditions are equivalent: 
Proof. The equivalence of conditions (i)-(iii) is a trivial consequence of Corollary 1. What needs to be shown is that
But if D ⊆ X is convex, the riskless prize y := α 1 x 1 + · · · + α n x n belongs to D, and the definition of U implies δ y δ x , as we sought.
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In passing, along the usual lines, we characterize concavity of functions in a utility set.
Remark 5. Given a set X as in Corollary 2, let U ⊆ C(X) be a utility set for an opencontinuous strict preference relation on ∆(X). Then, U consists of concave functions if and only if for every x, y in X, α, β in (0, 1) and p, q in ∆(X), we have
whenever p q. (We omit the simple proof of this assertion.) 36 Needless to say, even if D ⊆ X is convex, the set of degenerate lotteries supported at elements of D will be a nonconvex subset of ∆(X) whenever |D| ≥ 2.
37 In his work on consumer theory without the completeness axiom, Nascimento (2009) notes the equivalence of (i) and (iv) in an ordinal setup. The focus of Nascimento is a DMO type preorder induced by a compact set of utility functions. While Theorem B in Appendix B of this paper facilitates Nascimento's approach, his findings provide further instances of the uses of our representation theorems, for the desirable properties of the induced demand correspondence follow from some assumptions that allow Nascimento to conclude that the strict part of the preference relation that he studies behaves as if it is the restriction of an open-continuous strict preference relation to deterministic alternatives.
A Refinement of the Notion of Walrasian Equilibrium
The need to relax the completeness axiom has been long recognized in the literature on general equilibrium theory (see, e.g., Schmeidler, 1969; Mas-Colell, 1974) . However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the available models accounts for the nonbinary choice behavior that may arise as a consequence of incomparability of alternatives, as we discussed in the previous subsection. While Corollary 2 and Remark 5 provide sufficient conditions that make redundant the modification of the traditional approach that we will propose below, from a foundational point of view, concavity of utility functions over consumption bundles seems to be a rather strong requirement. In particular, a long tradition that models the notion of perfect competition using a continuum of agents avoids assuming convexity of preferences 38 over consumption bundles (cf. Aumann, 1966; Schmeidler, 1969) , which is, of course, a weaker property than concavity of utility functions.
39 Following this tradition, we will focus here on an exchange economy with a continuum of agents. For further motivation, let us first show that upon relaxation of the completeness axiom, even with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, a random mixture of (deterministic) consumption bundles available to a consumer may be preferable to a bundle that is, in fact, undominated by any other available bundle. Then u attains its maximum on X at the point x * := (16, 4), and v at z * := (2, 18).
Moreover, since both u and v are >-increasing and strictly quasiconcave on {x ∈ X : x 1 = 0 = x 2 }, for any y in the line segment [x * , z * ] and any x ∈ X\{y}, we have either
But with y := (5, 15) and p := We now consider an exchange economy. To compactify the domain of preferences, we 38 This well-known concept can be adapted to the present setting as follows: If X is a convex set of consumption bundles, then ⊆ ∆(X) 2 is convex on X if for every x, y in X, α, β in (0, 1) and p, q in ∆(X), we have βδ αx+(1−α)y + (1 − β)p βδ y + (1 − β)q whenever δ x δ y and p q. 39 In fact, convexity of preferences over consumption bundles would not suffice for the conclusion of Corollary 2. (See Example 3 below.) assume that each agent's consumption of a given commodity cannot exceed a sufficiently large number b > 0. Thus, the commodity space is given by X := {x ∈ R n + : x ≤ b} where b is the n-vector (b, ..., b) . (Similarly, 0 stands for the origin of R n .) The strict preference relation of a consumer t is denoted by t . We suppose that t is defined on ∆(X) (instead of X) which is a central departure from the classical approach. The consumer space is identified with a set T , a σ-algebra Σ of subsets of T , and a measure on Σ with (T ) < ∞. As usual, we assume that the measure space (T, Σ, ) is complete, that is, any subset of a -null member of Σ belongs to Σ as well. Each consumer t is endowed with a bundle e(t) ∈ X such that e : t → e(t) is a (Σ-Borel) measurable map. Given a measurable function g : = (g 1 , . .., g n ) that maps T into X, we set gd := T g 1 (t)d (t), ..., T g n (t)d (t) which is well defined by compactness of X. Such a function g is referred to as an allocation. An allocation g is said to be feasible if gd ≤ ed . In the remainder of this subsection, we will not distinguish between a point x ∈ X and the lottery δ x .
As usual, a Walrasian equilibrium refers to a price vector φ ∈ R n + \{0} and a feasible allocation g such that, for -almost every t ∈ T , the budget set B t (φ) := {x ∈ X : φx ≤ φe(t)} does not contain any element x with x t g(t). Our focus will be the following refinement of this traditional solution concept, which requires the consumption choice of an agent be undominated not only by the consumption bundles in her budget set, but also by any random mixture of such bundles. Definition 1. A Walrasian equilibrium (φ, g) is randomization proof if, for -almost every t ∈ T , there does not exist p ∈ ∆(X) such that p t g(t) and p(B t (φ)) = 1. WE ( t ) t∈T , e (resp. RPE ( t ) t∈T , e ) will denote the set of Walrasian (resp. randomization proof) equilibria. When each t is induced by a utility function u t ∈ C(X), we will write WE (u t ) t∈T , e instead of WE ( t ) t∈T , e .
Since the set {p ∈ ∆(X) : p(B t (φ)) = 1} equals co K Bt(φ) , as an immediate consequence of Corollary 1 (and the axiom of choice), we obtain the following characterization of randomization proof equilibria.
Corollary 3. For each t ∈ T , suppose that t is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X), and let U t ⊆ C(X) be a convex utility set for t . Then
where the union is taken over (u t ) t∈T such that u t ∈ U t for each t ∈ T .
The classical result of Schmeidler (1969) establishes the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with a continuum of traders and incomplete preferences. We will now strengthen this conclusion by proving the existence of a randomization proof equilibrium in the present setup. To this end, we need the following additional assumptions.
(A1) The measure space (T, Σ, ) is nonatomic, that is, for every T 0 ∈ Σ with (T 0 ) > 0 there exists a set T 1 ∈ Σ such that 0 < (T 1 ) < (T 0 ).
(A2) t ⇒ t is a graph-measurable correspondence from T into ∆(X)
2 , that is, its graph
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(A3) e i (t) > 0 for every i = 1, ..., n and t ∈ T .
(A4) For each t ∈ T, t is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X) such that b t 0.
(A1) formalizes the notion of perfect competition as suggested by Aumann (1966) and Schmeidler (1969) , among others. Measurability assumptions of the sort (A2) are also standard in this strand of literature. A merit of the present cardinal approach is that graph-measurability of the preference correspondence is equivalent to graph-measurability of a utility correspondence obtained upon a natural choice of normalization:
Lemma 1. Suppose (A4) holds. For each t ∈ T , let U +,t stand for the unique, convex (b, 0)-normalized utility set for t . Then, (A2) holds if and only if
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A. We are now ready to state our existence result which is a simple consequence of our previous findings and known existence results for the case of complete preferences.
Corollary 4. RPE ( t ) t∈T , e is nonempty whenever (A1)-(A4) hold.
Proof. Let U : t ⇒ U +,t be the correspondence defined as in Lemma 1. Since U is a graphmeasurable, nonempty valued correspondence from the complete measure space (T, Σ, ) into separable, complete metric space C(X), Aumann's measurable selection theorem implies that there exists a Σ-B (C(X)) measurable function t → u t such that u t ∈ U +,t for every t ∈ T (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 17.25, p.574) . From measurability of t → u t and the existence theorem of Khan and Yannelis (1991) , it easily follows that
41 Thus, we obtain the desired conclusion by Corollary 3.
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Remark 6. Following known approximation arguments, the conclusion of Corollary 4 can be extended to include the case X := R n + . Specifically, suppose that for each t ∈ T and b > 0, the restriction of t to lotteries over the compact box {x ∈ R n + : x ≤ b} is an open-continuous strict preference relation. Assuming e(T ) is a bounded subset of R n + , we can find a number a > 0 such that, for every t ∈ T and b ∈ N, the set X b (t) := {x ∈ R n + :
Then, upon modifying the statement of Lemma 1 so that X b takes the role of X (and ab that of b) , the existence result of Khan and Yannelis (1991) (which allows for t dependent consumption sets) would enable us to show that the economy induced by the consumption set correspondence t ⇒ X b (t) has a randomization proof equilibrium (φ b , g b ), for each b ∈ N. By normalizing and passing to a subsequence if necessary, one can assume that (φ b ) converges. Since (φ b , g b ) is also a Walrasian equilibrium of the corresponding economy, from Schmeidler's (1969, Section 4) findings it immediately follows that (φ b ) must actually be converging to a strictly positive vector if all commodities are desirable in the sense that x > y implies x t y, for each t ∈ T and x, y in R n + . Finally, given such a sequence (φ b ), it is a simple exercise to show that for all sufficiently large b, we have {x ∈ R
is a randomization proof equilibrium in the economy where consumption sets equal R n + .
Remark 7. Assuming (A2) and (A4), by a measurable selection argument it can be shown that in equation (6), we can restrict our attention to union over measurable selections of the correspondence t ⇒ U +,t . Put differently, the method that we used when proving Corollary 4 gives us a generic element of RPE ( t ) t∈T , e . Of course, such an equivalence result would not hold for the case of a DMO type preorder. However, one could still prove an analogue of Corollary 4 by finding an Aumann utility u t for each t ∈ T such that t → u t 41 While Khan and Yannelis (1991) assume convexity of preferences over consumption bundles, as they discuss in detail, this assumption becomes redundant when there are finitely many commodities and the consumer space is nonatomic (as we assume here). The key observation that allows us to utilize their existence theorem is that if t → u t is Σ-B (C(X)) measurable, then the induced weak preference correspondence on X 2 is graph-measurable; that is,
(This assertion is analogous to the "if" part of Lemma 1, and its proof is a routine exercise.) Continuity of u t on X, the definition of X, and the assumption (A3) immediately imply that the economy ((T, Σ, ), (u t ) t∈T , e, X) also satisfies the remaining hypotheses of Khan and Yannelis.
42 Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) prove a generalization of Schmeidler's (1969) result where agents' consumption sets are weakly compact subsets of a separable Banach space. Their key assumption formalizes the idea that there are "many more agents than commodities," and allows them to relax the convexity requirement of Khan and Yannelis (1991) , even when there are infinitely many commodities. Extending Corollary 4 to the framework considered by Rustichini and Yannelis, therefore, is a routine exercise. (I am grateful to Nicholas C. Yannelis for calling my attention to this point.)
is a measurable function.
On Weak Pareto Optimality and Social Planing with Incompletely Known Preferences
We now consider a finite society T := {1, ..., T } , and denote by X a compact metric space of social alternatives. Each agent t is assumed to have a strict preference relation t on ∆(X). The weak Pareto order wp is then defined as, for every p, r in ∆(X), p wp r if and only if p t r for every t = 1, ..., T .
The following result is a Negishi-type characterization of weak Pareto optimality that does not require completeness of agents' preferences.
Corollary 5. For each t = 1, ..., T , suppose that t is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X), and let U t ⊆ C(X) be a convex utility set for t . Then, for every convex
where the union is taken over
Proof. It is clear that
wp = U where U := T t=1 U t . Moreover, co (U) is a compact set that consists of all functions of the form
T t=1 α t = 1 and u t ∈ U t for every t = 1, ..., T . Thus, the proof follows from Proposition 1.
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Alternatively, in Corollary 5, we can consider t as a binary relation that represents the incomplete knowledge of a social planner about the strict part of preferences of agent t, which may themselves be complete. When viewed from this perspective, Corollary 5 resembles the efficiency theorems of McLennan (2002) and Carroll (forthcoming) . The present approach, however, differs from theirs in many respects. First, we do not directly assume that planner's knowledge about a given agent can be summarized by a set of utility functions. Rather, we derive this conclusion from the properties of the binary relations that model planner's knowledge. Second, we allow X to be infinite and do not restrict our attention to the grand set K = ∆(X). Moreover, the notion of optimality considered by McLennan and Carroll is stronger than weak Pareto optimality, and hence, requires different analytical tools. 
On Nash Equilibria of Games with Incomplete Preferences
Let us consider a finite set of players T := {1, ..., T }, and denote by t and i generic players. X t stands for the set of pure strategies available to player t, which is assumed to be a compact metric space. Thus, the set X := X 1 × · · · × X T of pure strategy profiles is also a compact, metrizable space. Each player t has a strict preference relation t on the set ∆(X). Given a generic element p := (p 1 , ..., p T ) of ∆ := ∆(X 1 ) × · · · × ∆(X T ), the product probability p ⊗ is the unique element of ∆(X) which satisfies p
It is important to note that for each f ∈ C(X), the real function p → E (f, p) := X f dp ⊗ is continuous on ∆ (with respect to the product topology) (see, e.g., Glycopantis and Muir, 2000) . We will denote by K a generic set of the form
The set of all such equilibria will be denoted by N E ( t ) t∈T , K . When each t is induced by a utility function u t ∈ C(X) (via the rule p t q iff X u t dp > X u t dq) we will write
subset of ∆(X) for each p ∈ ∆. Thus, as an obvious consequence of Proposition 1, we obtain the following characterization of Nash equilibria for convex games.
Corollary 6. For each t ∈ T , suppose that t is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X), and let U t ⊆ C(X) be a convex utility set for
As we have seen in Section 6.1, even with a single player, an equilibrium in pure strategies may not be an equilibrium when the use of mixed strategies are allowed. The next result is a game-theoretic version of Corollary 1, which shows that the scalarization method characterizes pure strategy equilibria that survive upon the introduction of mixed strategies. (We define K X := {(δ xt ) t∈T : (x t ) t∈T ∈ X}.) Corollary 7. For each t ∈ T , let t and U t be as in Corollary 6. Then:
Proof. That the left side of (7) is contained in the right side is an immediate consequence of Corollary 6 and definitions. To prove the other inclusion, first note that if a point x t ∈ X t maximizes the function u t (·, x −t ) on X t for some x −t ∈ × i =t X i and u t ∈ C(X),
. Thus, the right side of (7) is contained in N E (u t ) t∈T , ∆ . Hence, the proof follows from Corollary 6.
The notion of an ε-equilibrium can be adapted to the present setting as follows.
Definition 2. Let ( t ) t∈T and (U t ) t∈T be as in Corollary 6. For any number ε ≥ 0 and sets
As Fudenberg and Levine (1986) note, restricting the set of strategies available to players sometimes produces more tractable games. Hence, the following continuity result seems to be of interest.
Corollary 8. Let ( t ) t∈T and (U t ) t∈T be as in Corollary 6. For each t ∈ T , consider a convex set K t ⊆ ∆(X t ), and let (K n t ) be a sequence of subsets of K t . Suppose that the sets
45 Then, a strategy profile p belongs to
Proof. To prove the "if" part suppose that p, (p n ) and (ε n ) satisfy (i)-(iii). Then, for each
45 Since K n ⊆ K for each n, when K is closed, this is equivalent to saying that K is the Kuratowski limit of (K n ).
Since U is compact, by passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that (u n t ) t∈T converges to a vector of utility functions (u t ) t∈T ∈ U in the product of sup-norm topologies.
Fix any γ > 0, q ∈ K and t ∈ T. By hypothesis, there exists a sequence (q n ) ∈
As we noted earlier, for each f ∈ C(X) the function E (f, ·) is continuous on ∆. Hence,
Similarly,
≤ γ for all sufficiently large n.
Combining (8)- (12) 
As q ∈ K and t ∈ T are also arbitrarily chosen, we conclude that p ∈ N E (u t ) t∈T , K . By Corollary 6, this proves the "if" part. Conversely, suppose p ∈ N E ( t ) t∈T , K . Then, Corollary 6 implies that for some
Since the function E (u t , ·) is continuous on the compact space ∆, it is in fact uniformly continuous. Thus, the sequence γ
: q t ∈ ∆(X t )} tends to 0 as n → ∞. It follows that the sequence ε
Next, we observe that since p belongs to N E (u t ) t∈T , K , for each t ∈ T, q t ∈ K t and n ∈ N we have
and n ∈ N, upon setting ε n := max{ε n t : t ∈ T }, we conclude that p n is an (ε n , U + )-equilibrium for the K n -restricted game, for each n ∈ N.
It should be noted that the "only if" part of Corollary 8 could also be proved by combining Corollary 6 with the limit theorem of Fudenberg and Levine (1986) for games with complete preferences. However, the "if" part of Corollary 8 differs substantially from the corresponding finding of Fudenberg and Levine, for it forces us to deal with utility functions that vary with n.
The proof of Corollary 8 makes it transparent that pure strategy equilibria that can be identified with the scalarization method satisfy an analogous continuity property. By combining this observation with Corollary 7, we obtain a further characterization of pure strategy equilibria that survive upon the introduction of mixed strategies:
Corollary 9. Let ( t ) t∈T and (U t ) t∈T be as in Corollary 6. For each t ∈ T , let (X n t ) be a sequence of subsets of X t . Suppose that the sets
and (iii) p n is an (ε n , U)-equilibrium for the K X n -restricted game, for each n ∈ N.
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Remark 8. The results of the present subsection would not hold if players' preferences were definedà la DMO. In particular, the approximation idea above would entail an additional difficulty caused by the fact that a rich set of Aumann utilities that one may want to focus on need not be compact.
We conclude with an example that illustrates the contents of Corollaries 8 and 9.
Example 4. Consider an infinitely repeated game, where A := A 1 × · · · × A T is the set of action profiles in the stage game. We suppose that A t is finite and nonempty for each player t. For every integer n > 1 and every t ∈ T, we let F n t denote the set of all functions that map A n−1 into A t , and put F 1 t := A t . Thus, a pure strategy for player t is a sequence
It is clear that (the product topology of)
t × · · · is compact and metrizable. A pure strategy profile x := (x 1 , ..., x T ) ∈ X := X 1 × · · · × X T induces an outcome path a(x) := (a n (x)) ∈ A ∞ which is inductively defined by a
.., a n−1 (x))) for n > 1.
Each player t has a strict preference relation t on ∆ (A ∞ ). This induces a strict preference relation t on ∆ (X) as follows: For every p, q in ∆ (X),
where r a (A ) := r(a −1 (A )) for every A ∈ B(A ∞ ) and r ∈ ∆ (X). It is not difficult to verify that a(·) is a continuous map from X into A ∞ . 47 Thus, r a is a well defined element of ∆ (A ∞ ) for every r ∈ ∆ (X).
For each player t, assume that t is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆ (A ∞ ), and let V +,t ⊆ C(A ∞ ) be a convex utility set for t . Since v → v • a is an affine and continuous map from C(A ∞ ) into C(X), the set U t := {v • a : v ∈ V +,t } ⊆ C(X) is also convex and compact. Moreover, by changing variables, we can write A ∞ vdr a = X v • adr for any v ∈ C(A ∞ ) and r ∈ ∆ (X). By construction, it follows that t is an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆ (X), and U t is a convex utility set for t .
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Finally, fix a point (a 1 , ..., a T ) ∈ A and put X n t := {x t ∈ X t : x l t ≡ a t for every l ≥ n} for each n and t. Then, the sets X n := X n 1 × · · · × X n T converge to X in the sense of Corollary 9. Moreover, if we let K n t := {p t ∈ ∆ (X t ) : p t (X n t ) = 1} for each n and t, the sets
in the sense of Corollary 8. Hence, we can approximate both N E ( t ) t∈T , ∆ and K X ∩N E ( t ) t∈T , ∆ with (ε, U)-equilibria of the corresponding finite horizon games.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Observation 1. If U and satisfy (1) for every p, q in ∆(X), and if U consists of -increasing functions, then it readily follows that, for every p, q in ∆(X),
Thus, if U is a compact subset of C(X), then must satisfy the open-continuity property as we shall see in Appendix A1. Hence, the proof follows from Schmeidler's (1971) theorem.
Proof of Observation 2. Part (i) of this observation is obvious. For part (ii), let r ∈ ∆(X) be such that r({0}) = 0. To prove that r is ∧ -maximal, take any q ∈ ∆(X) with q = r. Then, there is a Borel set X 0 ⊆ X such that r (X 0 ) > q (X 0 ). First assume r ({1}) ≤ q ({1}). Then, as we also have r ({0}) ≤ q ({0}), it follows that r (X 0 \{0, 1}) > q (X 0 \{0, 1}). Hence, by normality of countably additive measures on a metric space, there exists a closed set F contained in X 0 \{0, 1} such that r(F ) > q(F ) (see Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 17.24, p. 574) . 47 To prove continuity of a(·), it suffices to note that for each x ∈ X and n ∈ N, there exists a neighborhood O of x such that y ∈ O implies y l t = x l t for every t ∈ T and positive integer l ≤ n, so that a l (y) = a l (x) for every such l.
48 As a minor point, let us note that nontriviality of t follows from surjectivity of r → r a . (In turn, that this map is surjective can be proved by noting that {r a : r ∈ ∆ (X)} is a closed, convex subset of ∆ (A ∞ ) which contains every degenerate lottery.)
For each ε > 0, let B ε := {x ∈ X : |x − y| < ε for some y ∈ F ∪ {0}}. Note that by Tietze extension theorem, there exists a function u ε ∈Û such that, for any x ∈ [0, 1],
It is plain that, for every p ∈ ∆(X),
u ε dp = 0.
Hence,
. Then, as v ε (1) = 1 for every ε ∈ (0, 1), we obviously have lim ε→0 E r (v ε ) = r({1}) and lim ε→0 E q (v ε ) = q({1}), implying that E r (v ε ) > E q (v ε ) for all sufficiently small ε. This completes the proof of (ii), which obviously implies (iii) as well.
That the first conclusion in part (iv) follows from (ii) is shown in text. In turn, the proof of antisymmetry of ∧ resembles the proof of part (ii), and hence, we omit it.
Proof of Observation 3 is implicit in our discussion of Propositions 1 and 1'.
A.1. First Proof of Theorem 1
Throughout the remainder of this appendix, we will sometimes write u(η) instead of E η (u).
First, we need to show that if condition (i) of Theorem 1 holds for a compact set U ⊆ C(X), then the open-continuity axiom must also hold. To this end, let U be such a set, and take any two lotteries p, q with p q. Continuity of the real function u → E p (u)−E q (u) on C(X) implies that there is a positive number γ such that E p (u) − E q (u) > γ for every u ∈ U. Moreover, since u → u is a continuous map from C(X) to C(∆(X)), from compactness of U it follows that the set { u : u ∈ U} ⊆ C(∆(X)) is also compact. By Arzelà-Ascoli theorem (see, e.g., Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, Theorem IV.6 .7, p. 266), we thus conclude that there is a neighborhood N of p such that u(p ) − u(p) > −γ/2 for every p ∈ N and u ∈ U. But for any such p , we have u(p ) − u(q) > γ/2 for all u ∈ U, and hence, p q by condition (i). Thus, the set {p ∈ ∆(X) : p q} is open, and similarly, so is the set {p ∈ ∆(X) : q p}. This verifies that satisfies the open-continuity axiom. The remainder of the proof of the "if" part of the theorem is trivial.
To prove the "only if" part, let be an open-continuous strict preference relation on ∆(X). Put C := {γ(p − q) : p q, γ > 0} and let S stand for the span of ∆(X) − ∆(X). It is worth noting that, by Jordan decomposition theorem, we have S = {η ∈ ca(X) : η(X) = 0}. The proof of the next claim is a routine exercise, and hence, omitted. Proof. Since (ca(X), · ) is isometrically isomorphic to the topological dual of the separable Banach space C(X), the weak*-topology of B λ is metrizable (see, e.g., Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, Theorem V.5.1, p. 426) . Let σ stand for a compatible metric. Suppose by contradiction that B λ ∩ C is not open in B λ . Then there exists a point µ ∈ B λ ∩ C such that, for every natural number n, we have σ(µ, µ n ) < 1/n for some µ n ∈ B λ \C. Note that µ = 0 since is irreflexive. So, by passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume for every n that µ n = 0, for the sequence (µ n ) converges to µ. Thus, for each n, by Jordan decomposition theorem we can write µ n = γ n (p n − q n ) for some mutually singular p n , q n in ∆(X) and γ n > 0. By mutual singularity we have p n − q n = 2 for every n, and hence, γ n ≤ λ/2. Since ∆(X) is compact and (γ n ) is bounded, it follows that there is an increasing self-map k → n k on N such that (γ n k ), (p n k ) and (q n k ) are convergent subsequences. Let the corresponding limits be γ, p and q, respectively. Since γ n k (p n k − q n k ) = µ n k converges to µ as k → ∞, clearly, we must have γ(p − q) = µ. It follows that γ > 0 and p − q = µ/γ ∈ C. So, by Claim 1, we have p q. Since is an open subset of ∆(X) 2 as we have shown in Remark 1, by definitions of p and q we conclude that p n k q n k for all large k, implying that µ n k belongs to C, a contradiction.
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49 The reader will notice in these arguments a few similarities with the proof of Claim 1 of DMO, which shows that for any preorder * on ∆(X) that satisfies their axioms, the set {γ(p − q) : p * q, γ > 0} is weak*-closed. The most important difference between the two exercises is that, Claim 1 of DMO implicitly benefits from a version of Krein-Šmulian theorem which ensures that a convex subset K of S is weak*-closed if K ∩ B λ is weak*-closed for every λ > 0 (see Appendix A.2 below). In our case, the analogue of The focus of our first method of proof is the closure of , which we denote by belongs to C as well. Now, we note that
Thus, by Claim 1, we see that αp
Finally, to show that * is transitive, consider lotteries p, q, r such that p * q and q * r. Then, there exist two sequences (q n ), (r n ) in ∆(X) such that q = lim q n , r = lim r n and q n r n for every n. Moreover, for any fixed α ∈ (0, 1), we have αp
Furthermore, by the independence axiom, we have αq
every n. Transitivity of therefore implies that αp
sufficiently large n. Passing to limit as n → ∞ gives αp
Since * is closed, passing to limit as α → 0 yields the desired conclusion: p * r.
By Claim 3, * satisfies all axioms of DMO. Hence,
a weak*-closed set by Claim 1 of DMO. As C ⊆ C * , it immediately follows that the algebraic closure of C, which we denote by acl (C), is contained in C * . Moreover, clearly, (14) and the definition of C * imply the converse inclusion: C * ⊆ acl (C). Hence, we see that acl (C) = C * is a weak*-closed set. Driving this conclusion is, in fact, the main purpose of Claim 3 in the present proof. Since Claim 2 obviously implies that C is algebraically open (relative to S), the first proof of Theorem 1 will easily follow from the next claim which will be proved momentarily.
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Claim 4. There exists a nonempty compact set U ⊆ C(X) such that:
We now show how the proof of Theorem 1 can be completed assuming Claim 4.
Claim 5. Given a set U as in Claim 4, for every p, q in ∆(X), we have p q if and only if u(p) > u(q) for every u ∈ U.
Proof. Consider any two lotteries p, q, and put µ := p − q. Suppose first that u(µ) > 0 for 50 Though Claim 2 appears to be indispensable for our purposes, in Appendix A.2, we will be able to give a shorter proof that does not make use of Claim 3. To this end, we will focus on openness of C with respect to an alternate topology that is finer than weak*-topology but coarser than the algebraic topology.
every u ∈ U. Then, as U is compact, there exists a number β > 0 such that u(µ) ≥ β for every u ∈ U. By using boundedness of U and part (ii) of Claim 4 in an obvious way, we therefore see that µ is in the algebraic interior of C * . But, as we discussed before, the set C * equals acl (C), and C is algebraically open. Thus, the algebraic interior of C * coincides with C, and hence, µ belongs to C. This amounts to saying p q, as we seek. Conversely, suppose now that p q and take any u ∈ U. As C is algebraically open and µ ∈ C, it follows that µ − αη
• ∈ C for some α > 0. By Claim 4(ii), we therefore have
We conclude with the proof of Claim 4.
Proof of Claim 4. Let us define
G is closed, and as a closed subset of G, the set U is also closed. Hence, by the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem, to verify compactness of U it suffices to show that this set is bounded and equicontinuous.
Since the weak*-topology is coarser than the norm-topology of ca(X), and since ∆(X) is a norm-bounded set, applying the open-continuity axiom to the lotteries p • , q • yields an α ∈ (0, 1), close enough to 1, such that p
In particular, we have p
We thus see by definition of U that
for every u ∈ U and x ∈ X. This shows that U is bounded.
Now let x ∈ X and ε > 0. Pick an α ∈ (0, 1) such that < ε for every z ∈ O and u ∈ U. Hence, U is also equicontinuous, as required.
What remains to show is that U is nonempty and that C + ⊆ C * , for the converse inclusion is trivial. To this end, we first note that since C * is a weak*-closed convex cone, by standard separation and duality arguments, for every η ∈ S\C * we can find a function u ∈ G such that u(η) < 0. < 0. Hence, η / ∈ C + , as we seek.
Next, we will present a shorter proof of Theorem 1 that benefits from some classical results in functional analysis instead of Claim 3. We believe, however, that Claim 3 may be of independent interest as it uncovers useful facts on the structure of open-continuous strict preference relations.
A.2. Second Proof of Theorem 1
The bounded weak*-topology on ca(X), which we denote by τ , is the finest topology that coincides with the weak*-topology on every positive multiple of the unit ball of ca(X); that is, on sets of the form B 
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It is known that τ is a locally convex linear topology, and a linear functional on ca(X) is τ -continuous if and only if it is weak*-continuous. These observations lead to KreinSmulian theorem: A convex subset of ca(X) is τ -closed if and only if it is weak*-closed. • λ is weak*-compact by the Banach-Alaoglu theorem.) 52 These results actually apply on the topological dual of any Banach space. For a detailed discussion, see Dunford and Schwartz (1957, Section V.5) , in particular Corollary V.5.5, Theorems V.5.6 and V.5.7.
−η
• = 2 (µ 1 + µ 2 ) ∈ C, i.e., q (ii) cl(C) = {η ∈ S : u(η) ≥ 0 for every u ∈ U}.
Now we complete the proof by modifying Claim 5 accordingly. Given a set U as in Claim 4', let the lotteries p, q and the number β > 0 be as in the proof of Claim 5; that is, assume u(p−q) ≥ β for every u ∈ U. Now pick any α ∈ (0, β). We will show that µ := p−q belongs to the τ -interior of cl (C) (relative to S). To this end, first note that µ + (C − αη • ) is a τ -neighborhood of µ, and any element η of this set is of the form η = µ + (µ 1 − αη • )
for some µ 1 ∈ C. From the properties of U, it thus follows that u(η) ≥ β − α > 0 for every η ∈ µ+(C−αη • ) and u ∈ U. Applying part (ii) of Claim 4' then yields µ+(C−αη • ) ⊆ cl (C).
Hence, µ belongs to the τ -interior of cl (C), as we argued. Since C is a τ -open convex set, the τ -interior of the τ -closure of C equals C. Thus, in fact, we have µ ∈ C. The remainder of the proof of Claim 5 applies as is.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
The "if" part of Theorem 2 is trivial. For the "only if" part, let U and V be (p • , q • )-normalized utility sets for an open-continuous strict preference relation . We first need to show that, for every p, q in ∆(X), By the proof of the uniqueness result of DMO, it thus follows that V is contained in cl (cone (U) + {β1 X : β ∈ R}) where cone (U) ⊆ C(X) is the smallest convex cone that contains U. Clearly, we can write cone (U) = γ>0 γ co (U). Hence, for each v ∈ V , there exist real sequences (β n ), (γ n ) and a sequence (u n ) in co (U) such that γ n u n + β n 1 X → v. Since convergence in sup-norm implies weak-convergence, and since u n (q • ) = 0 for every n, we then have lim β n = lim β n 1 X (q • ) = v(q • ) := 0. It follows that γ n u n → v, and hence, lim γ n = lim γ n u n (p • ) = v(p • ) := 1. These two observations, in turn, imply u n → v. Thus, V ⊆ co (U), and we similarly have U ⊆ co (V ) so that co (U) = co (V ). (ii) E p • (u) > E q • (u) for every u ∈ U and some p • , q • in ∆(X).
∆(X).
Compatibility with Strong Preference (CWSP
In view of our previous discussions, the "if" part of Theorem B is obvious. Moreover, a brief examination of the proof of Claim 4 suffices to establish the "only if" part. 53 Needless to say, by normalizing the set U as in text, one also obtains a uniqueness result that is analogous to Theorem 2.
